Studies of human behavior have attempted to determine an individual’s predisposition to taking risks and the level of involvement in accidents. In 1951, a study regarding injury-prone children was published by Elizabeth Mechem Fuller and Helen B. Baune of the University of Minnesota. The study consisted of two separate groups of second-grade students. Fifty-five students were considered accident repeaters, while 48 students had no accident history. Both groups came from the same school of 600 students, and their family demographics were similar.
The accident-free group demonstrated superior knowledge of safety and was considered industrious and cooperative with others, but they were not considered physically inclined. The accident-repeater group had better gymnastic skills, was considered aggressive and impulsive, demonstrated rebellious behavior under stress, were poor losers, and liked to be the center of attention.
One interpretation of this data—that an adult predisposition to injury stems from childhood behavior and environment—could lead to the conclusion that pilot groups should consist only of individuals who are safety-conscious, industrious, and cooperative.
Clearly, this is not only an inaccurate conclusion, but also an impossible one. Pilots are drawn from the general population and exhibit many different personality traits. Therefore, it is important that effective decision-making skills be taught to all pilots.
Historically, the term “pilot error” has been used to describe accidents in which an action or decision made by the pilot was the cause or a contributing factor. This definition also includes a pilot’s failure to make a correct decision or take appropriate action. From a broader perspective, the phrase “human factors related” more accurately describes these accidents.
A single decision or event rarely causes an accident. Instead, a chain of events and decisions gradually develops and leads to an unsafe outcome.
In his article “Accident-Prone Pilots,” Dr. Patrick R. Veillette uses the story of “Captain Everyman” to demonstrate how aircraft accidents are often caused by a series of poor decisions rather than a single mistake.
In one incident, after experiencing a gear-up landing accident, Everyman became involved in another accident while taxiing a Beech 58P Baron from the ramp. Interrupted by a radio call from the dispatcher, Everyman neglected to complete the fuel cross-feed check before takeoff. Flying solo, he left the right fuel selector in the cross-feed position.
Once airborne and in cruise flight, he noticed a right roll tendency and corrected it with aileron trim. He did not realize that both engines were feeding from the left wing tank, causing the aircraft to become unbalanced.
After two hours of flight, the right engine quit while Everyman was flying through a deep canyon gorge. While attempting to troubleshoot the right engine failure, the left engine also quit. Everyman landed the aircraft on a river sandbar, but it sank into ten feet of water.
Several years later, Everyman flew a de Havilland Twin Otter to deliver supplies to a remote location. Upon returning to home base and landing, the aircraft veered sharply to the left, departed the runway, and entered a marsh 375 feet from the runway. The airframe and engines sustained considerable damage.
During the investigation, accident investigators found the nosewheel steering tiller in the fully deflected position. Both the after-takeoff and before-landing checklists required the tiller to be placed in the neutral position, but Everyman had overlooked this item.
Was Everyman accident-prone or simply unlucky? Failing to complete checklist items appears to be a common factor in these accidents. While most pilots have made similar mistakes, many errors are corrected before becoming accidents because of larger safety margins, warning systems, attentive copilots, or simply good luck.
What makes a pilot less prone to accidents?
Successful pilots possess the ability to concentrate, manage workloads, and monitor and perform several tasks simultaneously. Some of the latest psychological screening methods used in aviation test applicants for multitasking ability, measuring both accuracy and the ability to focus attention on multiple subjects at the same time.
The FAA also conducted extensive research comparing accident-free pilots with those involved in accidents. The study surveyed more than 4,000 pilots, half of whom had clean records while the other half had been involved in accidents.
Researchers identified five common traits among pilots more prone to accidents. These pilots:
- Show disdain toward rules
- Have a strong correlation between aviation accidents and driving safety violations
- Frequently fall into the “thrill and adventure seeking” personality category
- Tend to be impulsive rather than methodical and disciplined in gathering information and selecting actions
- Often disregard or underutilize outside sources of information, including copilots, flight attendants, flight service personnel, flight instructors, and ATC
What is an "error chain" in aviation safety?
What did FAA research discover about a pilot's driving record and flight safety?
What cognitive skills help successful pilots remain accident-free?
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